Psychology and parecon

Albert and Hahnel reject behaviorism on the basis that there would be no real reason to advocate for change. In A Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics, they explain as such (bolded by me):

If we were totally a product of our worldly situations, we would be perfectly and infinitely moldable. If this were the case, the effects of environmental differences would eventually mold infinitely flexible humans into shapes as different from one another as diverse patterns of clay subjected to different pressures. With no genetic structural similarities people subjected to different environments would presumably be incapable of communicating or understanding one another. If humans had unlimited behavioral flexibility, treated to "proper socialization" we would be as satisfied living in isolation as in community, repeating mindless tasks as employing creative intelligence, and hating and being hated as loving and being loved. The only cause for us to feel uncomfortable, "alienated," or "oppressed" would be a discrepancy between what we had been molded to desire and what we actually received. As long as we were socialized to expect what was coming and to desire and appreciate it, we would be as happy and fulfilled in one set of circumstances as any other.

To the average person, this would imply that they're Freudians. However, in Unorthodox Marxism, they advocate to see society and people as one, which pits them against "vulgar Freudians" who

...assert that people are innately given in all their particulars, and that society and history are merely the representation of a host of individual givens in interaction.

In opposition to both Skinner and Freud, Albert and Hahnel propose to see society as an interaction between the human center and the institutional boundary; one refers to the total characteristics of people, and the latter refers to the roles and culture that people follow. This is explained in the hyperlink given above, though its also explained in Unorthodox Marxism and Liberating Theory.

They cite Giddens and his structuration theory as inspiration for their theory of the institutional boundary (note 23), however I believe that the inspiration for the human center is found within humanistic psychology, and that what Albert and Hahnel suggest lines up with self-determination theory specifically. This is the focus of this post, since Albert and Hahnel don't cite it as an inspiration and it can be very good to link economic theories to some type of empirical study.

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The idea that humanistic psychology is where Albert and Hahnel take inspiration for their idea of human nature isn't too hard to figure out; since they reject broadly Skinner's and Freud's theories, the only other popular force in 20th century psychology would be humanistic psychology, starting with Maslow and becoming popular with Rogers.

The points of humanistic philosophy is established by Greening (2006), adopted from Bugental:

1. Human beings, as human, supersede the sum of their parts. They cannot be reduced to components.
2. Human beings have their existence in a uniquely human context, as well as in a cosmic ecology.
3. Human beings are aware and aware of being aware—i.e., they are conscious. Human consciousness always includes an awareness of oneself in the context of other people.
4. Human beings have some choice and, with that, responsibility.
5. Human beings are intentional, aim at goals, are aware that they cause future events, and seek meaning, value, and creativity.

All of these line up perfectly with Albert and Hahnel's theory of human nature, as these points make up the basis for complimentary holism.

In determining where self-determination theory, more specifically basic needs theory (BNT), fits in with parecon, its better to do a comparison between proposals.

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BNT proposes first that humans have an innate need for autonomy (bolded by me):

The perceived locus of causality is theorized to be a cognitive construct representing the degree to which one is self-determining with respect to one's behavior. Events that lead to an external perceived locus of causality and undermine intrinsic motivation are those that deny one self-determination, whereas events that lead to an internal perceived locus of causality and enhance intrinsic motivation are those that facilitate self-determination. We often say that the former events control behavior, whereas that the latter events support autonomy.

Albert and Hahnel agree with this, and say that it comes from the recognition of our consciousness (sim.):

The human capacity to act purposefully implies the need to exercise that capacity. Not only can we analyze and evaluate the effects of our actions, we need to exercise choice over alternatives, and we, therefore, need to be in positions to do so. While some call this the "need for freedom," it is important to note that our "need for freedom" goes considerably beyond the "need for freedom" of many animal species. There are animals that cannot be domesticated or will not reproduce in captivity, thereby exhibiting an innate "need for freedom." But the human need to employ our powers of consciousness requires "freedom" beyond the "physical freedom" other species require. People require "freedom" to choose and direct their own activities in accord with their understanding and evaluation of the effects of that activity.

The 2nd proposition is that there is an inherent need for the feeling of competence:

External events will affect a person's intrinsic motivation for an optimally challenging activity to the extent that they influence the person's perceived competence, within the context of some self-determination. Events that promote greater perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation, whereas those that diminish perceived competence will decrease intrinsic motivation.

Albert and Hahnel assert this is also a consequence of our conscience (sim.):

Consciousness implies another species trait, which although not necessary for arguments concerning welfare theory proper, is very helpful to understanding how humans and societies function. Because we see ourselves as choosing among alternatives, we frequently need to interpret our choices in some positive light. If we saw our behavior as completely beyond our own control, there would be no need to justify it, even to ourselves. But to the extent that we see ourselves as choosing among options, it can be very uncomfortable if we are not able to "rationalize" our decisions. We need an interpretation of our involvement with the world that judges our activities to be effectively oriented toward achieving our purposes and our purposes to be in some sense worthwhile. In other words, we have the need for a positive self-image.

And finally, the 3rd proposition is that there is an inherent need for relatedness (sim.):

The third important philosophical assumption is that, although activity and optimal development are inherent to the human organism, these do not happen automatically. For people to actualize their inherent nature and potentials-that is, to be optimally active and to develop effectively--they require nutriments from the social environment. To the extent that they are denied the necessary support and nourishment by chaotic, controlling, or rejecting environments, there will be negative consequences for their activity and development. Thus, the organismic-dialectical meta-theory that underlies SDT (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a) highlights the interaction between the proactive growth-oriented human being and the social world that can either thwart or support activity, growth, and psychological well-being. Some positive psychology researchers have discussed the nurturing versus debilitating impact of the social environment on people's growth trajectories (e.g., Simonton, 2000; Winner, 2000).

 And this is something that Albert and Hahnel agree on, however they add some interesting points (sim.):

Human beings are a social species in a number of important senses. First, the vast majority of our needs and potentials can only be satisfied and developed in conjunction with other humans. Needs for sexual and emotional gratification can only be pursued in relations with others. Intellectual and communicative potentials can only be developed in relations with others. Needs for camaraderie, community, and social esteem can only be satisfied in relation with others.

Second, needs and potentials that might, conceivably, be pursued independently seldom are. For example, people could try to satisfy their economic needs self-sufficiently, but they seldom have because establishing social relationships that define and mediate elaborate divisions of responsibilities and benefits has always proved so much more "efficient." And the same holds true for spiritual, cultural, and most other needs. Even when desires might be pursued individually, people have generally found it more fruitful to pursue them jointly.

Third, human consciousness contributes a special character to our sociability. Numerous other animal species are social in the sense that many of their needs can only be satisfied in conjunction with one another. But human beings have the ability to understand and plan their activity. And since we recognize this ability in others, we logically hold them accountable and expect them to do likewise. Our social ties, therefore, stem not only from mutual activity and dependence but also from mutual conscious understanding and expectation.

In short, what Albert and Hahnel theorize in regards to an idea of human nature fits perfectly within humanistic psychology and self-determination theory.

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This is a bit of a simple post, but I think its interesting enough to write about and keep note; like I said in the beginning, it does give parecon a more grounded basis in reality to be linked to an actual school of psychology.