A small qualm about definitions

 One of the small, nagging issues I've found myself occasionally re-encountering is the definition of a commodity. My post on this is part trying to water the drought that is my blog, and part me trying to reach out to see if anyone has any thoughts.

My problem is this: The standard definition of a commodity that business-oriented firms or sites use feels too narrow to me, however I'm also not comfortable with the more Marxian definition of a commodity; that is, any item that enters a market for sale. What, then, is the definition of a commodity?

I have yet to know of any literature exploring a possible alternative definition of commodities and I have yet to arrive at a comfortable conclusion myself. Hopefully by posting this, people may be made aware of this and help guide me to some possible sources.

A small response to a small critique

Participatory economics proposes a system in which the planners communicate with the “participating” individuals, supposedly ones living in a commune together, to coordinate and meet the needs/wants of the people. The issue here is that the ECP deals with allocating the factors of production. It does not deal with the distribution of goods and services. Even under an economy that utilizes participatory economics, central planners could not determine how to allocate these factors of production rationally without a market-based price system. (from Debunk the ECP 🗿)

1. Parecon is not planners talking with "participating" individuals; what a laughable explanation! The simplest way to explain it is by recognizing 4 main ideas; (1), worker councils and consumer councils to represent supply and demand respectively, (2), participatory planning, (3) remuneration according to effort & sacrifice, and (4), self-management as having a say over the things that effect you.

2. Parecon deals with the allocation of factors by making worker councils submit production requests, where they say what they want to make and what they need to make it.

3. Parecon is not central planning; it is, in fact, as opposed to central planning as it is to markets.

A list of organizations to check out

 I'm mostly running dry of ideas for actual posts as of now, so I wasn't able to post anything for February. However, what I am able to do for now is to share a couple of organizations that I personally find amazing and believe should be supported by everyone. Hopefully, this will make up for my silence.

Political Violence At A Glance; an organization dedicated to studying violence - https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/

Lausan; a Hong-Kong-based news site that talks about China from a decolonial perspective - https://lausan.hk/

Real Utopia; an organization dedicated to participatory economics, and the one that I hope to be more active with - https://www.realutopia.org/

Deliberative Democracy Digest; a companion digest to the Journal of Deliberative Democracy that talks about the recent developments in the ideas of deliberative democracy - https://www.publicdeliberation.net/

Real-World Economics Review; a pretty good economics journal - http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/

Marginalia on LiquidZulu's *Notes on Austrian Economics* and Opening Statement

 I plan to debate an anarcho-capitalist, LiquidZulu, on Friday at 1530 EST; the debate will be streamed on his channel. This post is meant as a way for me to get familiar with his idea of Austrian economics, as I will be pitting parecon against it. Along with this, I will also view his opening statement in his debate against Pansabee.

My method of marking in regards to bolding and italics is fairly simple; bolded sentences are important and italicized sentences are secondarily important. The emphasis on these sentences, however, may differ in my notes.

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1

Praxeology is the study of human action, it provides a framework for understanding the purposeful behaviour of man. Any praxeological argument with sound logic and accepted axioms is necessarily true.

What evidence is shown that praxeological arguments are "necessarily true"? This is the 2nd sentence of the notes and we're already making claims that are supported by nothing.

This also assumes the idea that logic on its own makes a truth, which falls flat on its face with even a second of thinking. If one makes a sound argument that one could benefit from a smoking addiction, that doesn't necessarily then mean that it is true that one benefits from a smoking addiction; it stands against empirical evidence that shows that smoking can cause cancer.

 

2

Praxeology stands opposed to mainstream economic modelling in that it relies entirely on logical derivations from axioms to construct economic theories, not simply economic models. Moreover these theories may only be contested by discovery of a fault in ones line of reasoning, not by looking to historical examples — a praxeological argument can only be countered with another praxeological argument.

This is a fairly childish view of how economics should be developed. The idea that history cannot disprove empirical claims made by praxeologists strikes me as disingenuous at best; because you deal yourself within economics and economic policy, you inherently need to learn about the history of economic theory and policy in order to understand what works and what doesn't for the case you have. It is an imperative, then, to understand whether your predictions about economics at least fit within past experiences.

The line of reasoning here would make sense in something like a math equation that uses imaginary numbers, but like I mentioned, economics is far from something a priori like math.

It is also a concern that an argument made from praxeology can only seem to be refuted by more praxeology, despite saying previously that it must be contested by a line of reasoning. Must we only concern ourselves with disproving praxeology with more praxeology if we can instead address the underlying assumptions made within the field?

 

3

Praxeology relies on the assumption that humans act purposefully, which is the Axiom of Action. It implies the notion that value, wealth, profit, loss, and costs are all products of human thought, having no objective foundation — one cannot imagine their existence or conceive their alteration outside of a connection with acts of subjective valuation and choice.

This is a non-sequitur; although its supposed to be an argument in favor of the subjective theory of value (at least I assume), humans acting with a purpose doesn't then necessarily throw value into subjectivity.

4

...to refute a praxeological argument one must discover a fault in the chain of reasoning employed by the praxeologist. Empirical evidence may only serve to establish the appropriateness of a theory’s application to a particular event.

Praxeology, instead of making theories that only apply to a "particular event", makes claims about society at a large extent (we are self-interested/rational, we overinvest at lower interest rates, markets are the only rational method of economic calculation, etc etc). If it cannot describe a particular event, i.e., if the Austrian business cycle theory cannot explain 2008, it must either be fixed in order to account for the situation or it must be disposed of, it cannot be considered a "special case" type of theory. Like I said before, it becomes important to consider the very thing LiquidZulu chooses to reject.

 

5

Praxeology is distinct from psychology in that it simply wishes to describe subjective valuations and choices not to uncover the underlying motivations, thoughts, or ends from which they rose. Moreover, praxeological theories, as understood by Mises, are independent of the particular psychological makeup of individual — praxeology does not address the content of individual preferences or the particular motives that give rise to those preferences, it is solely concerned with the pure logic of choice.

Why would you dedicate yourself to studying human action and not understand why humans act? Along with this, why would you not understand the content of preferences? What if a preference is more socially harmful than another? These are fairly important things to consider in regards to studying human action and yet its all brushed aside.

 

6

The Action Axiom, “human action is purposeful behaviour,” describes mans conscious aiming at ends and selection of means to achieve those ends. This is distinct to unconscious behaviour such as involuntary reflexes.

How much action would this exclude if we want to exclude subconscious behavior? These behaviors take up a good majority of our actions, and so to exclude them seems peculiar.

7

Action is always necessarily rational, as an acting man is always aiming his action to satisfy some desire. The terms rational and irrational are meaningless with respect to the subjective goals of a man.

This seems a bit nonsensical; what if the action the man does to try and satisfy himself doesn't work and yet he insists it will?

8

...let’s imagine that Steve actually wanted to go to the Beatles concert but someone told him that it would be held in the park, when it actually wasn’t, can Peter now call Steve’s decision irrational? Steve went to the wrong location, but he was acting on the information available to him — he did his best. Moreover, just because a man fails to achieve his end does not mean that the means he employed were irrational — since no one is in a position to substitute their own values for those of another it is futile to pass judgements on the values of an acting man, the only place where a praxeologist may pass judgement is on whether the means chosen are fit for achieving the desired end. This means that, in short, praxeology is value-free.

This assumes that the situation in question has obvious conclusions, which means that the situation is so simple that no values are needed. This gets complex once we introduce more moral situations; is a man justified in murder for a desire, even if he may be arrested or hunted down?

 

9

Meaningfully denying this axiom is difficult, denial of the axioms empirical validity involves a purposeful act on the sceptic's part. It therefore confronts them with the uncomfortable choice of either ceding the issue or proclaiming that their own disagreement is purposeless.

This reductio ad absurdum can only work for an individual; its hard to prove that others act without using something outside of empirical evidence. It has about as much applicability to others as "I think, therefore I am".

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1

Anarcho-Capitalism is composed of two parts that are unsurprisingly, anarchism and capitalism. Anarchism as a philosophy advocates strict adherence to natural law, namely an anarchist asserts the truth of and says that one ought to abide by the non-aggression principle, or NAP. This NAP is a priori true for all acting men as it derives from the pure logic of conflict.

Anarchism does not advocate to follow "natural law"; I'm very unsure what actual anarchist literature that Zulu has read in order to believe this. Anarchism, above all else, is against hierarchy. The early anarchists, especially Stirner, likely would even reject the concept of "natural law", let alone the adherence to it.

You'd also have to prove (1) the existence of "natural law", and (2) that this "natural law" includes the NAP. Both of these, even if natural law exists, seem very unlikely to be done.

2

Austrians are unlike many other economists in that they do not attempt to model economics through mathematics like one would with more empirical sciences, rather [they make] long chains of logical deductions from apodictic truths are common in Austrian arguments making them in turn objectively true. These chains of logical deductions are done through praxeology, the general science of human action, and thus they can only be contended with either through a praxeologic counter-argument, or by rejecting praxeology all together. Such a rejection would imply that different groups have different ways of reasoning making it impossible to reason about reasoning in general, which is known as a polylogism, coming in a few main forms, including historicism, the belief that throughout the course of history the logic of human action changes, race polylogism asserting that each race has its own logic, and class polylogism, the contention that different classes have different ways of reasoning.

As I've addressed before, Zulu gives no argument to support the idea that praxeology is "objective" and only asserts the idea.

I also find the notion that everyone thinks exactly the same way is fairly ridiculous; the fact that I even object to your worldview is proof of this claim. It doesn't imply "polylogism", but rather that people have different lives and different experiences that develop their lines of reasoning; while dumpster-diving behind a GameStop may not make sense to one person, it will make sense to another as a trove of hidden gems.

I also also hope that I really shouldn't have to explain why my view on reasoning may also explain the differences in thinking when it comes to class, which is something that Albert and Hahnel expertly discuss. 

 

3

It is a common contention by those on the left that anarcho-capitalism is a fake anarchism, and that my summation above is not in keeping with the ontological history of anarchy. To refute this I cite Proudhon, the father of anarchism, in his “what is property:”

Neither heredity, nor election, nor universal suffrage, nor the excellence of the sovereign, nor the consecration of religion and of time, can make royalty legitimate. Whatever form it takes, — monarchic, oligarchic, or democratic, — royalty, or the government of man by man, is illegitimate and absurd.

It is from this that the oft-shortened definition of anarchism as “no-rulers” can be derived, i.e. if we define the government of man by man as rulership it is implicit. This is where leftists will attempt to be anti-hierarchy qua hierarchy by asserting that all hierarchies involve rulership, which is false. Hierarchy is implied by consent, i.e. the hierarchy of who gets a say over the use of my body is me on top and every other person below — a hierarchy, yet one that does not violate anyones consent. We can resolve this by saying that ruling someone isnt just being higher on a hierarchy than them, it is imposing rules on them, which is how we allow for consent and adherence to natural law, as a system of consent implies a system that is conflict avoiding.

This is a sore misreading of Proudhon and anarchism in general. First, it is important to note that hierarchy is never implied by consent, for if it required consent, then it wouldn't be a hierarchy since one could revoke consent and the structure is dissolved. The consent of hierarchy could only work in individual preferences like religion, and not in what I assume would be a traditional capitalist firm structure. Hierarchy also cannot simply mean imposing rules, for if it did, a rich person who spends no money on lobbying politicians would somehow not be considered higher on the hierarchy than a poor person.

This is all assuming that Zulu's interpretation of Proudhon is correct, which it sadly isn't; the most that Zulu does is provide the quote that shows that anarchism is against no rulers. Everything else afterwards is all Zulu's own ideas.

 

4

Natural law theory is the area of philosophy that deals with the discovery of conflict avoiding and resolving norms, norms that can be objectively found given those two requirements. Aggression being the initiation of conflict is obviously illegal, as it is the negation of conflict avoidance, therefore the NAP is an objectively correct legal axiom.

How is conflict being contradictory to no conflict make the NAP an "objectively correct" law? Pacifism reaches the same idea of being against conflict in a more succinct manner; aggression should be avoided because violence is morally bad. Does this make pacifism also "objectively correct"? If so, does this then imply that ancaps should be pacifists? If not, then why?

 

5

We can further justify self-ownership by considering the alternatives, as Rothbard explains:

…if each man is not entitled to full and 100% self ownership then what does this imply? It implies either one of two conditions: (1) the “communist” one of universal and equal other-ownership, or (2) partial ownership of one group by another - a system of rule by one class over another.

The problem with (1) is that it cannot make for a general ethic for humanity if we wish for humanity to continue surviving, which is the case for both myself and my interlocutor. One may not utilise property without the owners permission, so universal other-ownership would imply that one may not act without first seeking the permission of every other man, but such a seeking of permission would require action on the part of the man who wishes to act, and approval of such request would require yet more action on the part of the permission-givers who must each therefore ask permission ad infinitum.

This is, if it isn't obvious, a complete strawman of communism, as even Marx never advocated for "other-ownership" and at most advocated for proletarian state ownership; he spoke about how the individual would be able to perform whatever job and task he pleases under communism, as he would be freed from the limiting experiences of capitalism. Ain't saying Marx is good or anything, but he cared more about liberty than anyone dared to note.

Psychology and parecon

Albert and Hahnel reject behaviorism on the basis that there would be no real reason to advocate for change. In A Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics, they explain as such (bolded by me):

If we were totally a product of our worldly situations, we would be perfectly and infinitely moldable. If this were the case, the effects of environmental differences would eventually mold infinitely flexible humans into shapes as different from one another as diverse patterns of clay subjected to different pressures. With no genetic structural similarities people subjected to different environments would presumably be incapable of communicating or understanding one another. If humans had unlimited behavioral flexibility, treated to "proper socialization" we would be as satisfied living in isolation as in community, repeating mindless tasks as employing creative intelligence, and hating and being hated as loving and being loved. The only cause for us to feel uncomfortable, "alienated," or "oppressed" would be a discrepancy between what we had been molded to desire and what we actually received. As long as we were socialized to expect what was coming and to desire and appreciate it, we would be as happy and fulfilled in one set of circumstances as any other.

To the average person, this would imply that they're Freudians. However, in Unorthodox Marxism, they advocate to see society and people as one, which pits them against "vulgar Freudians" who

...assert that people are innately given in all their particulars, and that society and history are merely the representation of a host of individual givens in interaction.

In opposition to both Skinner and Freud, Albert and Hahnel propose to see society as an interaction between the human center and the institutional boundary; one refers to the total characteristics of people, and the latter refers to the roles and culture that people follow. This is explained in the hyperlink given above, though its also explained in Unorthodox Marxism and Liberating Theory.

They cite Giddens and his structuration theory as inspiration for their theory of the institutional boundary (note 23), however I believe that the inspiration for the human center is found within humanistic psychology, and that what Albert and Hahnel suggest lines up with self-determination theory specifically. This is the focus of this post, since Albert and Hahnel don't cite it as an inspiration and it can be very good to link economic theories to some type of empirical study.

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The idea that humanistic psychology is where Albert and Hahnel take inspiration for their idea of human nature isn't too hard to figure out; since they reject broadly Skinner's and Freud's theories, the only other popular force in 20th century psychology would be humanistic psychology, starting with Maslow and becoming popular with Rogers.

The points of humanistic philosophy is established by Greening (2006), adopted from Bugental:

1. Human beings, as human, supersede the sum of their parts. They cannot be reduced to components.
2. Human beings have their existence in a uniquely human context, as well as in a cosmic ecology.
3. Human beings are aware and aware of being aware—i.e., they are conscious. Human consciousness always includes an awareness of oneself in the context of other people.
4. Human beings have some choice and, with that, responsibility.
5. Human beings are intentional, aim at goals, are aware that they cause future events, and seek meaning, value, and creativity.

All of these line up perfectly with Albert and Hahnel's theory of human nature, as these points make up the basis for complimentary holism.

In determining where self-determination theory, more specifically basic needs theory (BNT), fits in with parecon, its better to do a comparison between proposals.

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BNT proposes first that humans have an innate need for autonomy (bolded by me):

The perceived locus of causality is theorized to be a cognitive construct representing the degree to which one is self-determining with respect to one's behavior. Events that lead to an external perceived locus of causality and undermine intrinsic motivation are those that deny one self-determination, whereas events that lead to an internal perceived locus of causality and enhance intrinsic motivation are those that facilitate self-determination. We often say that the former events control behavior, whereas that the latter events support autonomy.

Albert and Hahnel agree with this, and say that it comes from the recognition of our consciousness (sim.):

The human capacity to act purposefully implies the need to exercise that capacity. Not only can we analyze and evaluate the effects of our actions, we need to exercise choice over alternatives, and we, therefore, need to be in positions to do so. While some call this the "need for freedom," it is important to note that our "need for freedom" goes considerably beyond the "need for freedom" of many animal species. There are animals that cannot be domesticated or will not reproduce in captivity, thereby exhibiting an innate "need for freedom." But the human need to employ our powers of consciousness requires "freedom" beyond the "physical freedom" other species require. People require "freedom" to choose and direct their own activities in accord with their understanding and evaluation of the effects of that activity.

The 2nd proposition is that there is an inherent need for the feeling of competence:

External events will affect a person's intrinsic motivation for an optimally challenging activity to the extent that they influence the person's perceived competence, within the context of some self-determination. Events that promote greater perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation, whereas those that diminish perceived competence will decrease intrinsic motivation.

Albert and Hahnel assert this is also a consequence of our conscience (sim.):

Consciousness implies another species trait, which although not necessary for arguments concerning welfare theory proper, is very helpful to understanding how humans and societies function. Because we see ourselves as choosing among alternatives, we frequently need to interpret our choices in some positive light. If we saw our behavior as completely beyond our own control, there would be no need to justify it, even to ourselves. But to the extent that we see ourselves as choosing among options, it can be very uncomfortable if we are not able to "rationalize" our decisions. We need an interpretation of our involvement with the world that judges our activities to be effectively oriented toward achieving our purposes and our purposes to be in some sense worthwhile. In other words, we have the need for a positive self-image.

And finally, the 3rd proposition is that there is an inherent need for relatedness (sim.):

The third important philosophical assumption is that, although activity and optimal development are inherent to the human organism, these do not happen automatically. For people to actualize their inherent nature and potentials-that is, to be optimally active and to develop effectively--they require nutriments from the social environment. To the extent that they are denied the necessary support and nourishment by chaotic, controlling, or rejecting environments, there will be negative consequences for their activity and development. Thus, the organismic-dialectical meta-theory that underlies SDT (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a) highlights the interaction between the proactive growth-oriented human being and the social world that can either thwart or support activity, growth, and psychological well-being. Some positive psychology researchers have discussed the nurturing versus debilitating impact of the social environment on people's growth trajectories (e.g., Simonton, 2000; Winner, 2000).

 And this is something that Albert and Hahnel agree on, however they add some interesting points (sim.):

Human beings are a social species in a number of important senses. First, the vast majority of our needs and potentials can only be satisfied and developed in conjunction with other humans. Needs for sexual and emotional gratification can only be pursued in relations with others. Intellectual and communicative potentials can only be developed in relations with others. Needs for camaraderie, community, and social esteem can only be satisfied in relation with others.

Second, needs and potentials that might, conceivably, be pursued independently seldom are. For example, people could try to satisfy their economic needs self-sufficiently, but they seldom have because establishing social relationships that define and mediate elaborate divisions of responsibilities and benefits has always proved so much more "efficient." And the same holds true for spiritual, cultural, and most other needs. Even when desires might be pursued individually, people have generally found it more fruitful to pursue them jointly.

Third, human consciousness contributes a special character to our sociability. Numerous other animal species are social in the sense that many of their needs can only be satisfied in conjunction with one another. But human beings have the ability to understand and plan their activity. And since we recognize this ability in others, we logically hold them accountable and expect them to do likewise. Our social ties, therefore, stem not only from mutual activity and dependence but also from mutual conscious understanding and expectation.

In short, what Albert and Hahnel theorize in regards to an idea of human nature fits perfectly within humanistic psychology and self-determination theory.

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This is a bit of a simple post, but I think its interesting enough to write about and keep note; like I said in the beginning, it does give parecon a more grounded basis in reality to be linked to an actual school of psychology.

Racism? In my economics textbook?

So, recently in a Discord server with a couple of friends, we decided to look at an old economics textbook: the 14th edition of Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies, published in 1998. We, as heterodox economists, had thought we were just going to have a chuckle at the nonsense that was mainstream economics at least in the late 90s. What we encountered, however, was nothing less than shocking.

This was their section on the sociological obstacles to economic growth in developing countries:

 

Now, we must remember that 70% of the world population lives in underdeveloped countries and the least developed countries are in Africa, and the authors of this textbook are American; in light of that, these passages are almost wholly racist. If I have to explain it, much of the reason why these underdeveloped countries are the way they are is because developed countries (namely the majority of Europe and America) have exploited their resources and labor, leaving them in the dust in comparison.

We, of course, had a disgusted chuckle to each other, noting how mainstream economists usually ignore imperialism and the analysis of it; I personally noted how my high school American history class managed to cover imperialism not only better, but more in-depth than this textbook. It was surprising looking at their coverage of developing countries and the "viscous cycle" didn't even mention how places like Europe or America had a role in underdeveloping Africa. It was a shame, we said, that this textbook likely got taught to classes at least 5 years after it was published.

We were curious what further versions of the textbook had to say about this same topic. It turns out it didn't change a single bit:

 

 The fact that these racist lies were being pushed in 2017 (and likely still are in the 2021 edition) and are likely being taught in many classes through this textbook is not only disgusting, but also a dark reflection on the current state of mainstream economics. The second fact that this is published by the overly-expensive McGraw-Hill might leave salt on the wound, as well.

I am hoping, if anything else, to contact them about this textbook and the concerns I have over not only the accuracy of the claims made, but also the implications that are brought about by further, perhaps crude, consideration, i.e. Africa just doesn't want to develop and join everyone else in the economy. In the meanwhile, I'm hoping to bring awareness to this major flaw and perhaps in the future make a more focused criticism on the textbook's explanation of why underdeveloped countries came to be.

Small Update

This isn't going to be anything major; I just wanted to make sure I didn't leave this blog as dry as a desert since last month.

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As a small update to my hobby of economics, I finally have a chance to get a real copy of Unorthodox Marxism in my hands once Christmas comes along; this means I'll be able to start getting a complete idea of what Albert/Hahnel have in political economy. I'm hoping to work on not only making a condensed version of the book, but to also have it up in either a Word document or PDF file so that way people can easily access it.

I'm not closer to really figuring out a generalized SRTV (however its possible that I may have ran into an issue; more on that later), however as a friend managed to help me find the elusive page 360, I find that Albert/Hahnel did start with a price for the first good (R):

But before I do anything else in regards to Unorthodox Marxism, I'm getting the book.

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As an aside on my IRL presence, I've recently been accepted into East Carolina University through their Pirate Promise program, which means that once I finish my associates degree at my local community college, I can transfer to ECU without hassle. I'll be able to continue working on my thoughts on economics more extensively there, and I hope to be able to provide more content to share on here (aside from Unorthodox Marxism, of course). I'm deeply grateful for this opportunity, and I hope to put it to good use in the future.